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A Forgotten Revolution?
Army Co-operation Command and 
Artillery Co-operation, 1940-1942
M A T T H E W  P O W E L L
Abstract: This article looks at the development of the Air Observation Post 
during the inter-war period and the Second World War. It places these 
developments within the context of the procedures that had emerged from 
the First World War. Further to this it analyses the role played in this 
process by Army Co-operation Command and its commander, Air Marshal 
Sir Arthur Barratt, who it has been claimed previously did all he could to 
prevent the development of the Air Observation Post concept. Evidence will 
show Barratt’s actions in a new light especially against his experiences in 
the Battle of France.
T h is  a r t i c l e  a s s e s s e s  the role of the Royal Air Force’s (r a f ) Army Co-operation Command in the development of artillery 
observation in Britain between 1940 and 1942. It provides the 
historical context by exploring the artillery procedures in use during 
the First World War. These methods changed little by the outbreak 
of the Second World War in 1939,1 and failed in the fluid, mobile 
warfare the British Expeditionary Force (b e f ) faced during the 
German offensive in France in 1940.2 The article then analyzes the
1 Hilary Saunders, Per Ardua: The Rise of British Air Power 1911-1939 (New York 
and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1944), 256-7; Shelford Bidwell and Dominick 
Graham, Fire-Power: The British Army Weapons and Theories of War 1904-1945 
(Barnsley: Pen and Sword Military Classics 2004 [George Allen and Unwin, 1982]), 150.
2 H.J. Parham and E.M.G.Belfield, Unarmed Into Battle: The Story of the Air 
Observation Post, 2nd ed. (Chippenham: Picton Publishing, 1986), 5-6. John Buckley,
© Canadian Military History 23, no. 1 (Winter 2014): 71- 88.
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work undertaken by the newly created Army Co-operation Command 
in response to that failure, and particularly examines the part played 
by its commander, Air Marshal Sir Arthur “Ugly” Barratt. Historians 
have misinterpreted his role as deliberately obstructionist. This is 
too simplistic an explanation of his actions and motives. It fails to 
take into account his experience as an artillery officer in the First 
World War, and as the Royal Air Force commander in France in 
1940, which made him at once an advocate of closer inter-service 
cooperation and a sceptic about hasty solutions.3
THE FIRST WORLD WAR
The First World War considerably changed artillery ranging and 
spotting procedures. Both sound ranging and flash spotting involved 
locating enemy artillery batteries when the guns were fired.4 Sound 
ranging used microphones to detect the sound, while flash spotting 
identified the location of the batteries through the flash emitted 
through firing. These changes were brought about by the advent of 
mass armies, the industrial scale high explosive munitions combined 
with the use of aircraft creating a revolution in military affairs.5 The 
ingenuity required to combine air and land forces was great, but 
the outcome, if successful, would make the whole greater than the 
sum of its parts. With the distances between the guns increasing, 
judging the fall of shot became more difficult. These distances also 
required the artillery to develop techniques for “indirect fire,” that 
is to engage targets unseen by the battery commander.6 The Royal 
Artillery had no experience using this weapon at the operational
“The Air War in France,” in Brian Bond and Michael D. Taylor, eds., The Battle 
of France and Flanders, 1940: Sixty Years On (Barnsley : Leo Cooper, 2001), 122.
3 Parham and Belfield, Unarmed Into Battle, 21. Peter Mead, The Eye in the Air: 
A History of Air Observation and Reconnaissance for the Army 1785-1945 (London: 
Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1983), 163.
4 Bidwell and Graham, Fire-Power, 109.
5 Jonathan Bailey has described this combination as the first and only true revolution 
in military affairs. See Jonathan B.A. Bailey, “Deep Battle 1914-1941: The Birth of 
the Modern Style of War,” Field Artillery Journal (July-August 1998): 21-7. There 
is still a fierce debate between historians as to whether the developments in artillery, 
aircraft and the scale on which it was used constitutes a revolution in military affairs. 
One of the best counter-arguments to Bailey’s claims is made by Bidwell and Graham.
6 The Royal Artillery “paid lip service to concealment” and the idea of indirect fire. 
Bidwell and Graham, Fire-Power, 21.
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level as such a use was never contemplated.7 Several methods were 
developed in order to assist artillery batteries correct their fall of 
shot as quickly as possible and increase the efficiency of the guns.8
Artillery co-operation with aircraft developed quickly as the 
conditions of static trench warfare allowed artillery-spotting techniques 
to advance at a more rapid pace than if the conflict had been a 
mobile war.9 One of the first major developments that took place 
was the creation and refinement of the “clock code” system.10 Using 
this system, a pilot of the Royal Flying Corps (r f c ), the forerunner 
to the r a f , was able to correct the guns’ fall of shot by passing to 
the artillery battery commander by wireless the details of how far 
the shell impacts were from the target. The pilot would correct the 
shooting by pointing out how far away and in what direction the 
artillery shells had landed. The distance would be communicated 
using numbers and the direction using the picture of a clock face. 
The target was placed in the middle of the clock face and shells that 
fell beyond the target and on a straight line to the target would be 
corrected with a call of 12, if it fell short on the same line the call 
would be six, at 90 degrees left of the target nine and 90 degrees right 
three. Any other direction would be corrected by using the hour on 
the clock with which it corresponded.
This system functioned perfectly well throughout the First World 
War and was the basic system that the r a f  went to war with in 1939 
during shoots against impromptu targets. During the First World 
War, aircraft conducted artillery reconnaissance in relative safety 
behind their own lines. They were able to align themselves with the 
battery and target in a timely fashion and allowed this type of co­
operation to flourish. Due to the r f c  being under army command, 
aircrew were able to mix and socialize with the gunners they were 
supporting, increasing mutual understanding and efficiency. When
7 Jonathan B.A. Bailey, The First World War and the Birth of the Modern Style of 
Warfare (London: Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, 1996), 7-9. Bidwell and 
Graham, Fire-Power, 19-21.
8 Jonathan B.A. Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower (Oxford : Military Press,
5.
9 David Ian Hall, Strategy for Victory: The Development of British Tactical 
Air Power, 1919-1943 (Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger Security 
International, 2009), 4. Peter Simkins, Air Fighting 1914-1918: The Struggle for 
Air Superiority over the Western Front (London: Imperial War Museum, 1978), 11.
10 Ralph Barker, A Brief History of the Royal Flying Corps in World War I  (London: 
Constable & Co., 2002), 63.
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unfamiliar formations were working together, however, that efficiency 
fell away.11
In 1915, a new technique was tried using the kite balloon. 
Hydrogen-filled balloons allowed spotters to remain in the air for 
extended periods as compared to aircraft of the day. Enemy artillery 
batteries were able to remain silent whilst enemy aircraft were in 
the vicinity overhead, but they did not have that advantage when 
balloons were stationed around that section of the line. The balloons 
were, however, vulnerable to long-range shelling and had to be taken 
down in the event of an attack. Vulnerability to both ground and 
air fire meant that observers carried parachutes, a luxury that had 
not been afforded to pilots. The r f c  troops in the balloon could 
communicate with the battery via a telephone link, unavailable to 
aircraft, and corrections were made using the “clock code” system. By 
1916, this co-operation improved with the introduction of a relatively 
lightweight wireless telegraphy (w / t ) transmitter, which facilitated 
communications between air and ground. Another improvement 
in ground-air communication was the Central Wireless Station 
“established in late 1916 ... These provided a logical solution to the 
problem of directing attack aircraft against targets encountered by 
corps [that is, artillery spotting] machines.”12 Because of developments 
in wireless technology, a number of aircraft could be controlled on any 
given length of front. This enabled “any observer ... to communicate 
with any battery via a telephone exchange and rapidly engage any 
target that he could identify in pre-arranged zones of the front.”13
The return to fluid battles in late 1918 had very little effect upon 
the methods used by the r a f  for conducting artillery observation 
because the techniques had been so thoroughly developed and 
practised during the period of static trench warfare. David Jordan 
has highlighted that at the Third Battle of the Aisne in M ay- 
June 1918, “the very fact that artillery work was nothing more 
than routine by this point implies that the r a f  had mastered this 
duty.”14 They were assisted by the flash spotting and sound ranging 
techniques developed by the Royal Artillery. These techniques
11 Barker, A Brief History of the Royal Flying Corps, 85.
12 Barker, A Brief History of the Royal Flying Corps, 85, 89, 91, 142; David Jordan, 
“The Army Co-operation Missions of the Royal Flying Corps/Royal Air Force 1914­
1918,” PhD Thesis, University of Birmingham, 1997, 315.
13 Mead, The Eye in the Air, 100. Bidwell and Graham, Fire-Power, 102.
14 Jordan, “Army Co-operation Missions of the Royal Flying Corps/Royal Air
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allowed counter-battery work to continue even when German artillery 
batteries were camouflaged or the weather prevented flying. The 
major problem that the r a f  encountered during the Allied advance 
in 1918 was that, due to the relative speed of the advance, the 
German guns could simply not be located.15 This meant that while 
the techniques themselves were sound, they could not be as widely 
applied as before.
THE AIR OBSERVATION POST
For the most part, interwar training for artillery observation 
continued to use procedures similar to those of 1917.16 Peacetime 
conditions imposed constraints, notably as a result of the lack of 
sufficient artillery ammunition : “miniature ranges ... were used in 
squadrons to introduce pilots to artillery procedure but could not 
teach artillery observation.”17
The system of correcting artillery fire for an impromptu shoot 
remained unchanged until 1938. One difficulty, according to Shelford 
Bidwell and Dominick Graham, was that this system “still required 
specially trained Royal Air Force Officers using a special procedure 
flying in slow aircraft in enemy air space and vertically, or thereabouts, 
over the target.”18 A less perilous approach, the Air Observation Post 
(a i r  o p ) concept, was developed in 1935 by Captain H.C. Bazely, 
Royal Artillery, who was secretary of the Royal Artillery Flying 
Club. In the words of Bidwell and Graham:
Bazely’s idea was to provide batteries or brigades of the Royal Artillery 
with the same sort of small, low-powered aircraft that the officers of 
the flying club flew for pleasure, able to take off from a meadow or a 
dirt strip close to the gun positions. The aircraft was to be merely a 
mount or a flying platform for artillery officers, who would use ordinary 
artillery procedures for ranging a battery. They would not fly over
Force,” 279.
15 Jordan, “Army Co-operation Missions of the Royal Flying Corps/Royal Air 
Force,” 198-199, 310.
16 Mead, The Eye in the Air, 149.
17 Mead, The Eye in the Air, 149.
18 Bidwell and Graham, Fire-Power, 262.
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enemy territory, but over their own guns or near them, gaining enough
height to targets on ground dead to ground OPs.19
The Air Ministry opposed modifying the clock code system as they 
believed it was adequate to meet the future needs of the army. They 
felt that light aircraft could no longer remain in action close to 
artillery units, as had been the case in the First World War and that 
artillery officers could not be trained to the necessary standard of 
airmanship. The Air Council feared introducing a new and untried 
procedure with the growing tensions in Europe at this time. The War 
Office was unimpressed with the Air Council’s attitude and pushed 
for more to be done. The Air Ministry agreed to trials by 22 [Army 
Co-operation] Group and the School of Artillery in December 1938. 
These and further trials, showed that light aircraft could observe fire 
with the “clock code” system. Supermarine Spitfires conducted mock 
attacks and the Taylorcraft light aircraft observing the artillery fire 
demonstrated the agility to evade these modern fighters.20 There was, 
however, no training for pilots in registering targets for the artillery. 
If an artillery officer required an appraisal of a prospective target 
the request had to be sent up the command chain via an air liaison 
officer. When the information on the target finally came back to the 
artillery battery, it was usually out of date.21 There was pressure 
from within the War Office to establish a Flying Observation Post 
(f l y i n g  o p ) and to begin flying training for gunner officers, and 
thus overcome r a f  aircrews’ lack of knowledge of suitable targets. 
A  f l y i n g  o p , operating behind the Allied front for protection by 
friendly anti-aircraft guns, was to work in conjunction with the 
Ground Observation Post ( g r o u n d  o p ) in establishing targets to be 
engaged.
The first of these f l y i n g  o p s  was established in February 1940 
“to determine in the light of practical experience obtained under war 
conditions the possibilities and limitations ... the most suitable type 
of aircraft and the most suitable organization.” The tests were to be 
conducted in three parts, an initial training period, then a training
19 Bidwell and Graham, Fire-Power, 262.
20 Parham and Belfield, Unarmed Into Battle, 14. Bidwell and Graham, Fire-Power, 
262-263.
21 Darrell Knight, Artillery Flyers at War: A History of the 664, 665, and 666 
‘Air Observation Post’ Squadrons of the Royal Canadian Air Force (Bennington: 
Vermont: Merriam Press, 2010), 27.
6
Canadian Military History, Vol. 23 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 4
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol23/iss1/4
period with the French, and finally a test in the French Army area 
including shoots against German targets. At this time, the term Air 
Observation Post was adopted. The observer aircraft, “Air OP Flight 
(D Flight),” went to France on 19 April 1940 and then began the 
test programme. Arrangements for the final -  combat -  phase were 
completed on 9 May 1940,22 but the following day the Germans invaded 
France and the Low Countries.23 The French artillery designated for 
the trials was forced to return to their formations leaving the a i r  o p  
Flight waiting for the campaign to stabilize. When it was clear that 
this would not happen, the observer aircraft returned to England.24 
The development of the a i r  o p  had been started too late to have any 
effect on the Battle of France or to gain any operational experience 
with which to develop the concept. The fault for the delay can to a 
certain degree be attributed to the Air Council, which was reluctant 
to alter existing doctrine and slow to set up the a i r  o p .
ARMY CO-OPERATION COMMAND
The r a f ’s  new Army Co-operation Command, created on 1 December 
1940, became responsible for D Flight. It had up to six aircraft 
on strength, which, aside from a single Stinson Voyager, included 
Taylorcraft Plus machines.25 One of the first and most pressing 
problems the new command had to address was the development 
of artillery cooperation policy in concert with the army. David Hall 
broached the major issue for both services after the defeat in France: 
“Who should control aircraft on the battlefield?” -  and what those 
aircraft should do.26 “Advocates of the Air Observation Post were 
faced with the greatest challenges,” in the words of Darrell Knight: 
“The most pressing question being asked was, ‘how much risk was
22 Parham and Belfield, Unarmed Into Battle, 15-6.
23 Karl-Heinz Freiser, The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the West 
(Annapolis: Maryland, Naval Institute Press, 2005), 79.
24 Parham and Belfield, Unarmed Into Battle, 16.
25 Parham and Belfield, Unarmed Into Battle, 15. Army Co-operation Command at 
this time consisted of several squadrons of Lysander aircraft.
26 David Hall, “Lessons Not Learned: The Struggle between the Royal Air Force and 
Army for the Tactical Control of Aircraft, and the Post-mortem on the defeat of the 
British Expeditionary Force in France in 1940,” in Gary Sheffield and Geoffrey Till, 
eds., The Challenges of High Command: The British Experience (Basingstoke and 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 113.
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too much for an airborne OP pilot to survive while flying at low level 
in the face of enemy ground formation, or in a sky filled with enemy 
fighters?’ ”27
There had been serious problems with the use of slow and 
obsolescent Westland Lysander aircraft to fulfil that role during the 
fighting in France. The few attempts that had been made to conduct 
air shoots resulted in the destruction of the aircraft or it being driven 
off by enemy fighters.28 As a result, most artillery observation during 
the Battle of France was done by g r o u n d  o p  units.29 Between the 
defeat in France and the creation of Army Co-operation Command, the 
army, while preparing anti-invasion measures, attempted to develop 
an air observation policy. That there was very little enthusiasm in the 
r a f  is hardly surprising as the service was preoccupied with fighting 
the Battle of Britain. Still, the air force clearly understood that air 
observation for artillery fire was a vital necessity for land warfare.30
One of the first steps to changing artillery co-operation policy was 
a letter from the director of military co-operation, Air Commodore 
Victor Goddard, to Barratt at Army Co-operation Command. Not 
only was Barratt one of the senior officers most experienced in 
army co-operation, he had begun his military career in the artillery. 
He was therefore exceptionally well qualified to develop artillery 
procedure as well as larger army co-operation issues.31 In this letter, 
Goddard stated that the Air Staff were against the formation of 
“special air units for artillery observation or reconnaissance, unless 
it can be clearly shown that there is an urgent requirement for such 
units which cannot be met by Army Co-operations squadrons.”32 To 
allow Army Co-operation squadrons an opportunity to fulfil this role, 
Goddard argued that artillery co-operation policy should be modified 
and re-stated, even if this required the development of a new aircraft. 
Goddard wanted the aircraft of the a i r  o p  to “act as an elevated 
observation post [that] was to be capable of flying off and landing on
27 Knight, Artillery Flyers at War, 32.
28 Parham and Belfield, Unarmed Into Battle, 17.
29 Knight, Artillery Flyers at War, 32.
30 Parham and Belfield, Unarmed Into Battle, 18.
31 < http://www.kcl.ac.uk/lhcma/locreg/BARRATT.html>, accessed 25 April 2013.
32 The UK National Archives [TNA] AIR 39/47, Letter from Air Commodore 
Goddard, Director of Military Co-operation to Barratt regarding Artillery Co­
operation Policy, 8 December 1940.
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a position close to the guns with which it would be co-operating, and 
was to be piloted by a gunner officer competent to perform a shoot.”33
Lieutenant-Colonel J.D. Woodall, the senior army staff officer 
at Army Co-operation Command, requested a report on what 
organizational form the a i r  o p  should take if it were developed. He 
also wanted the report to address the role of Army Co-operation 
squadrons in artillery work if the a i r  o p  was or was not developed. 
The report, completed on 18 December 1940, gave the School of 
Artillery’s view that the a i r  o p  had not truly represented “that for 
which it was originally intended” because of the different meanings 
ascribed to the term “Observation Post” by the gunner and layman. 
The school wished to further emphasize that “the Air OP is, and 
has always been, intended to carry out a role entirely similar but 
supplementary to that of the normal Artillery OP on the ground.”34 
The a i r  o p  should be developed on the basis of one per artillery 
regiment and should contain one officer pilot of the Royal Artillery 
and three other ranks. The role of Army Co-operation squadrons fell 
into four distinct areas, only two of which have relevance to this paper. 
These would be reconnaissance to supplement what could be seen 
by g r o u n d  o p s  and constantly observe the areas where the hostile 
batteries were located while active operations were in progress.35
The School of Artillery believed that the role of army co­
operation squadrons faced very little change regardless of whether 
the a i r  o p  was fully developed. The officers of army co-operation 
aircraft, however, required additional training in land operations to 
ensure they thoroughly understood army requirements and operating 
methods ; in short to make certain that air crew spoke the same 
language as the people they were supporting on the ground. A  certain 
number should specialize in artillery work and attend the School of 
Artillery. In this way, the School of Artillery sought to allow aircraft 
to have tactical control over the fire of artillery batteries. The school 
further advised that a multi-seat aircraft should be employed to 
accommodate an artillery officer who would conduct the shoot and 
thus obviate the need for artillery officers learning to fly. Artillery
33 TNA AIR 39/47, Letter from Air Commodore Goddard, 8 December 1940.
34 TNA AIR 39/47, Report on Artillery Co-operation, 18 December 1940.
35 The four areas were the observation of the forward zone, constant observation of
the hostile battery area while operations were in progress, occasional observation
further over enemy lines and to produce photographs on which to base future fire 
plans. TNA AIR 39/47, Report on Artillery Co-operation, 18 December 1940.
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officers, the school also recommended, should be seconded to army 
co-operation squadrons specifically for artillery work.36
Number 70 Group, a training group, and 71 Group, the operational 
formation of Army Co-operation Command, agreed that the a i r  o p  
performed a necessary service and should be allocated on the scale of 
one per artillery regiment. The groups also felt that any changes in 
the fire procedure that shortened the time aircraft spent performing 
that role “is an asset.” One of the ideas put forward to effect this 
recommendation was the adoption of artillery methods of fire control.37 
The co-operative spirit evident in the report of 18 December 1940 is 
surprising in view of the strained relations between the army and r a f  
in the wake of the Battle of France.38 The officer appointed by the 
army to conduct its investigation of that defeat was General William 
Bartholomew, renowned for his anti-R A F  feelings and a hatred of 
combined service solutions. He approached the investigation with the 
conviction that the army’s tactical doctrine during the battle had 
been sound. It was the r a f  and a lack of the correct type of air 
support that had led to the disaster on the continent.39 By contrast, 
the agreement on air-land cooperation in artillery work between the 
School of Artillery and the officers of 70 and 71 Groups is an example 
of the good relations that existed between lower formations.
In January 1941, Barratt wrote to the under-secretary of State for 
Air describing the best way to co-operate with the Royal Artillery : 
“I consider that in order to get a true and undistorted picture of 
this problem, it is first desirable to set out the problem as the Army 
sees it, and to show in this picture what they conceive to be their 
requirements.”40 Again, the desire to see the problem from a view 
that would almost certainly be contradictory to the r a f  shows that 
Barratt and his command were willing to adopt a different approach 
and attitude in co-operating with at least one part of the army. 
In an appendix to this letter the School of Artillery’s opinion was
36 TNA AIR 39/47, Report on Artillery Co-operation, 18 December 1940.
37 TNA AIR 39/47, The Future of Artillery Co-operation Replies from Nos. 70 and 
17 Groups, 18 December 1940.
38 For more information on the army’s reaction to the Battle of France see TNA 
CAB 106/220, Bartholomew Committee Final Report. Hall, pp.55-9.
39 Alistair Byford, “The Battle of France, May 1940: Enduring, Combined and Joint 
Lessons,” Air Power Review 11, no.2 (Summer 2006): 68.
40 TNA AIR 39/47, Letter from Barratt to Under-Secretary of State for Air regarding 
co-operation with the Royal Artillery, 29 January 1941.
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again put forward, outlining the role that aircraft should play in 
artillery spotting. The school argued that with the change in the 
tempo of warfare the old methods would simply not produce the 
required results. It is “no longer possible for an aircraft carrying 
out artillery reconnaissance to patrol methodically over territory 
occupied by the enemy.” The way to adapt to these new conditions 
was to have high observation posts from which it would be possible to 
see much more of the battlefield and, as a result, be able to direct the 
fire of several artillery batteries.41 In the case of operations in Britain 
against a German invasion, the vulnerable aircraft conducting the 
reconnaissance for the artillery would come under the protection of an 
umbrella of aircraft from Fighter Command.42 Nevertheless, Barratt 
voiced his concerns about the ability of the a i r  o p  to operate in the 
face of enemy action: “the Air OP must be entirely vulnerable to any 
enemy fighters which cares to shoot it down.”43 Barratt’s frequently 
expressed concern over the safety of the pilots conducting shoots as 
an a i r  o p  using the gunner system can partly be explained through 
his experiences during the Battle of France. He had had to send 
aircrews to their deaths by ordering unsuitable Fairey Battle aircraft 
to attack temporary German pontoon bridges across the Meuse River 
after the Germans had crossed and been able to organize effective 
anti-aircraft defences.44
The communications system recommended for use in aircraft 
conducting artillery co-operation was also the subject of much 
discussion. One of the major issues was whether to use wireless 
telegraphy or radio telephony. One of the overriding factors that 
influenced this decision was the simplicity of training : “The time 
factor and the constant flow of casualties will prevent any possibility 
of producing a class of highly skilled specialists.” The main features 
of the air observers’ training emphasized artillery gunnery procedures 
and the tactical knowledge of flying required to get maximum value 
out of his observation. To simplify the training as much as possible
41 TNA AIR 39/47, Appendix A to Letter from Barratt to Under-Secretary of 
State for Air regarding co-operation with the Royal Artillery, 29 January 1941, 
Report on Artillery Requirements in Air Co-operation as they affect Royal Air Force 
Commitments.
42 TNA AIR 39/47, Letter from Army Co-operation Command to Headquarters No. 
71 Group, Artillery Reconnaissance -  Policy and Training 20 March 1941.
43 TNA AIR 39/47, Appendix A, 29 January 1941.
44 Hall, Strategy for Victory, 51.
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special communications procedures were to be abolished. The use of 
radio, in contrast to wireless telegraphy, did not require “such officers 
acquiring a fairly high standard of morse [code], and maintaining 
a constant handiness in the manipulation of the Artillery Code.” 
The recommendation was for an artillery officer “acting as his own 
signaller and transmitting orders by two-way R/T.”45 Later, in 
February 1941, Barratt argued that the aircraft currently available 
for artillery co-operation (Lysanders) could not perform the role 
expected under the new proposals, especially in the face of “even 
moderate enemy opposition” and that the squadrons must be re­
equipped with a fighter aircraft in order to be able to fully carry out 
artillery observation.46
POLICY DEVELOPMENT
In response to a letter from No.71 Group regarding the development 
of policy and training for the artillery observation role, Army Co­
operation Command stated they felt that “the case against the Air 
OP would seem probably conclusive.”47 A further reply in late March 
to No.71 Group’s letter argued that working in an anti-invasion role 
artillery co-operation aircraft were to use a “flash-spotting” technique, 
provided the topography was already known. With anti-invasion 
measures implemented in the summer of 1940, it must be assumed 
that the majority of the topography over which these operations 
were conducted would already be known due to familiarity with the 
potential landing areas. There was also confirmation that the current 
procedure was still to be used in these circumstances.48
Further trials of a new artillery procedure were conducted in 
March 1941 when the aircraft observed and corrected the fall of shot 
as it flew over the target. A single-seat fighter was best suited to 
this role, which required flying over enemy lines, and for this reason
45 TNA AIR 39/47, Memorandum regarding Artillery/Air Co-operation. 6 February 
1941.
46 TNA AIR 39/47, Memorandum on Artillery Reconnaissance, February 1941.
47 TNA AIR 39/47, Memorandum in reply to a Letter from No. 71 Group to Army 
Co-operation Command. Letter dated 14 February 1941. Memorandum dated 17 
March 1941.
48 TNA AIR 39/47, Letter to No. 71 Group from Army Co-operation Command, 
Artillery Reconnaissance -  Policy and Training, 20 March 1941.
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a Hawker Hurricane carried out the trials. The first test, which used 
the old reconnaissance procedure, was designed to “find out if there 
was any difficulty in positioning a low wing monoplane while making 
the observations.” In the words of the report, “there was none.”49 The 
second shoot took into account the tactical situation that might be 
faced by aircraft in this role. During this shoot the initial ranging 
salvos were timed to arrive at the target at the same time as the 
aircraft.50 The procedure was altered slightly : the order to fire was 
“answered by two salvos instead of three, since it was considered to 
be too difficult to make three observations during one run over the 
target.” The final shoot simulated the observation of long-range fire 
by a delay of 30 seconds between the order to fire and the firing of 
the guns. Thus the pilot had to time his run more accurately to allow 
for both the delay in the guns firing and the time required for the 
aircraft to reach the target. The major conclusion reached from these 
trials was that the Hurricane was not suitable for prolonged artillery 
reconnaissance shoots because the pilot, having to keep a lookout for 
enemy aircraft while operating his own high performance machine, 
was not able to give his attention to the ground for more than a few 
seconds.51
During a conference held at the headquarters of Army C o­
operation Command it was suggested the “clock code” system be 
abolished and replaced by the normal artillery procedure.52 The pilot 
would correct shots by ordering the battery to add, drop, or adjust 
left or right in divisions of one hundred yards. A  trial held in April 
1941, on similar lines to the one in March but using Lysander aircraft, 
showed that with suitable weather conditions artillery reconnaissance 
could be conducted without penetrating enemy territory, and that with 
two-way radio communications, the artillery method of correcting fire 
was quicker than using the “clock code.” An impromptu shoot could 
also be conducted with an unaassigned battery using the artillery
49 TNA AIR 39/47, Artillery Reconnaissance in a Single Seater Fighter Type, March 
1941.
50 TNA AIR 39/47, Artillery Reconnaissance in a, Mar 1941; TNA AIR 39/47, 
Letter from the Under Secretary of State for Air to Barratt, 5 April 1941.
51 TNA AIR 39/47, Artillery Reconnaissance in a Single Seater Fighter Type, March
1941.
52 TNA AIR 39/47, Conference at Headquarters Army Co-operation Command on 
Artillery Reconnaissance, Procedure, Orthodox Artillery Co-operation, 9 April 1941.
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method.53 The pilots were “unanimous [in their opinion] that this 
method of directing fire to fall on the targets, is simpler and quicker 
than the clock code method of observing the fall of the rounds.” The 
Lysander was also more effective in this role than the Hurricane due 
to “its excellent visibility, its small turning circle, and its ability to 
operate from improvised advanced landing grounds, and the fact that 
it has its own tail protection.”54
Barratt responded sceptically. He considered “that body 
of experience gained in the late war and since has all pointed to 
the advantages of the ‘Clock Code’ system.”55 56This viewpoint was 
reinforced by the senior artillery officer of Eastern Command, 
Brigadier Duncan, although he believed that the a i r  o p  had a useful 
function supplementing the information gained through normal 
artillery reconnaissance, including the land o p .56 Barratt noted that 
with highly trained pilots it had always been possible to shoot a 
battery from the air using the artillery method. Barratt’s belief in the 
“clock code” system stemmed not from conservatism, but more from 
fear of conclusions drawn from brief experiments being widely applied 
among air crew who by the nature of wartime circumstances could 
not be highly trained.57 When Barratt had to account to the under 
secretary of state for air for the lack of efficiency in air cooperation 
with artillery he wrote that it “has been due to the propagation of 
rumour as to other and better methods than those shown in AP1176 
[The R A F  Manual of Army Co-operation].”58
Further trials were conducted using the artillery method during 
April 1941 and reached similarly positive conclusions “Artillery 
methods of ranging by corrections to line and range are simpler, 
quicker, and more efficient than any method based on the ‘clock 
code.’ They lend themselves more readily to observation from a low 
altitude behind our own lines, and are more in accordance with 
the realities of modern air fighting and A A  [anti-aircraft] defence.”
53 TNA AIR 39/47, Artillery Co-operation Trials -  Part I, April, 1941.
54 TNA AIR 39/47, Artillery Co-operation Trails -  Part II, April 1941.
55 TNA AIR 39/47, Letter from Headquarters Army Co-operation Command to 
Headquarters No. 70 Group, Artillery Reconnaissance Trials, 12 April 1941.
56 TNA AIR 39/47, Note for Commander-in-Chief on Brigadier Duncan’s visit, 14 
April 1941.
57 TNA AIR 39/47, Army Co-operation Command to No. 70 Group.
58 TNA AIR 39/47, Letter from Barratt to Under Secretary of State for Air, 14 
April 1941.
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Further, these methods “for air observation [would] result in a 
simplification of training problems for both to the Royal Artillery and 
R A F .”59 Concerns remained as high up as the Air Ministry that the 
modified procedure had not been adequately proved, and that there 
should be further, exhaustive trials.60 These concerns were reinforced 
by instructions for artillery training issued by the chief of the general 
staff (c g s ): “The procedure to be used during this summer [1941] is 
that laid down in A P  1176. Units of Home Forces will not carry out 
experimental shooting with modified procedures.”61
Problems with the old “clock code” system in the fighting in 
Libya meanwhile echoed those in France in 1940.62 Barratt retorted 
that the “clock code” system was not at fault, but that the aircraft 
employed in North Africa, as in France, were operating in the face 
of intense enemy opposition. He too was unconvinced by the trials 
in March and April 1941; they had been too few and were skewed in 
favour of a positive result by the School of Artillery.63 These views 
might be interpreted as simply blocking a new development that had 
been shown to work in order to preserve the autonomy of the r a f . 
Yet that conclusion would ignore the close cooperation of Barrett’s 
command with the army in the trials.64 Barratt in fact meant what 
he said about the need for more trials. With the success of these 
extended trials, Barratt was then convinced that pilots were able to 
conduct a shoot and that training in this new method could be done 
quickly. The new procedure was to be effective from 15 June 1941.65
The work for Barratt in this area was not finished with the adoption 
of the new procedure. The trials showed that the new procedure 
worked most efficiently with two-way radio communications. This 
system used two radios sets, the Army No.11 Set on the ground and, 
in the Tomahawk Army Co-operation aircraft, an Army No.19 Set.66
59 TNA AIR 39/47, Report from Headquarters No. 70 Group to Army Co-operation 
Command, 15 April 1941.
60 TNA AIR 39/47, Letter from Air Ministry to J.D. Woodall, 26 April 1941.
61 TNA AIR 39/47, Draft Copy of instruction an Artillery Reconnaissance training, 
April 1941.
62 TNA AIR 39/47, Letter from CGS on Artillery Reconnaissance, 5 May 1941.
63 TNA AIR 39/47, Letter from Barratt to Major-General Otto Lund, GHQ Home 
Forces, in response from letter from CGS on Artillery Reconnaissance, 10 May 1941.
64 TNA AIR 39/47, Barratt to Lund, 10 May 1941.
65 TNA AIR 39/47, Minutes of Meetings held at the School of Artillery, Larkhill, 
21 June 1941.
66 TNA AIR 39/48, Letter from Barratt to the Under-Secretary of State for Air
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Barratt later argued in a letter to the Under-Secretary of State for 
Air that the major problem in attempting to use the two-way radios 
was in the allotment of suitable frequencies on the artillery radio net. 
“ [T]his promising suggestion should not be turned down because of 
the frequency difficulty,” and the War Office should be pressed on 
the matter.67 The director of telecommunications wrote to Barratt 
assuring him that the War Office saw no difficulty in “allotting 
suitable frequencies to Squadrons for Artillery Co-operation.”68
The School of Artillery still experienced problems in conducting 
training exercises in the new procedure because of the unavailability 
of aircraft. The problem was overcome “by the good will of the School 
of Army Co-operation.”69 Army Co-operation Command responded to 
an appeal from the School of Artillery by assigning No.225 Squadron 
for these exercises.70 During a one-week practice camp using the new 
procedure in early 1942 the pilots and artillery officers lived together 
as they had done during the First World War which improved the 
camaraderie and co-operation between the services.71
CONCLUSION
The procedure for artillery reconnaissance first developed during 
the First World War where there was little movement no longer 
suited the needs of modern warfare. In the earlier conflict the 
relatively stable front lines allowed a system to develop, but it was 
only fully effective in those particular conditions. The British forces 
very quickly discovered this difficulty during their first major land 
combat of the Second World War, the Battle for France in1940. The 
attitudes of both the British Army and the r a f  to co-operation 
during the interwar period had done little to improve the situation
regarding Artillery Co-operation, 15 August 1941.
67 TNA AIR 39/48, Letter from Barratt to the Under-Secretary of State for Air, 3 
September 1941.
68 TNA AIR 39/48, Letter from the Director of Telecommunications to Barratt, 9 
October 1941.
69 TNA AIR 39/48, Letter from the Senior Air Staff Officer, Army Co-operation 
Command to Headquarters, No. 36 Wing, 24 October 1941.
70 TNA AIR 39/48, Letter from Headquarters No. 36 Wing to Senior Air Staff 
Officer, Army Co-operation Command, 10 October 1941.
71 TNA AIR 39/48, Letter from Army Co-operation Command to 32, 34, 35 and 36 
Wings regarding Artillery Practice Camp, 26 March 1942.
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before the b e f  was despatched to France. The movement of the 
a i r  o p  to France in February 1940 to gain experience conducting 
a potentially different form of artillery reconnaissance occurred 
too late and did not provide any real guidance in the wake of the 
disastrous campaign.
This left those charged with the responsibility of modifying the 
existing procedure with only the experience of the First World War 
to guide them and on which to base their expectations. Much co­
operation between the School of Artillery and Nos. 70 and 71 Groups 
of Army Co-operation Command occurred, despite the general feeling 
of animosity between the services.72 This co-operation was the most 
that had been seen between the army and r a f  since the formation of 
the r a f  as an independent force in 1918. Historians have interpreted 
Barratt’s move to block the adoption of the new procedure during 1941 
as a simple block of the a i r  o p  concept which prevented co-operation 
with the army in this area. As this article demonstrates, however, 
Barratt’s objections were more complex than a simple rejection of an 
army idea. He was the senior r a f  officer with the most experience 
in army co-operation work and could bring additional expertise 
as a former artillery officer. His caution in adopting new methods 
was derived from his need for the affirmation of the results already 
achieved through more rigorous testing and trials in to confirm 
the results. The trials also established the suitability of specialist 
observation aircraft for this role. The additional testing would expose 
the procedure and those responsible for carrying it out to more stress 
and thus ensure a greater degree of authenticity in the results. Trials 
of this nature would also confirm whether the procedure could be 
implemented with ease by the majority of pilots whose responsibility 
would be increased from observing the fall of shot to conducting 
shoots, potentially in the face of enemy opposition. Barratt’s major 
concern with the new system appears to be its increased complexity 
and he was rightly concerned after his experiences in France that 
pilots would be unable to conduct the shoot while also watching for 
enemy fighter attacks.
72 Hall, Strategy for Victory, 89-103.
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